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When Mohammed Goes to the Mountain:
The Evidentiary Value of a View
LAYNE S. KEELE°
INTRODUCTION
"If the hill will not come to Mahomet, Mahomet will go to the hill."' "The courts,
like [Mohammed 2] have sensibly recognized that if a thing cannot be brought to the
observer, the observer must go to the thing."3 An official excursion by a fact-finder to a
site that bears relevance to litigation is known as a "view. ' 4 Views have long been
recognized as appropriate procedure in certain circumstances, going back virtually to
* J.D. Candidate, 2005, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.B.A.,
2001, Freed-Hardeman University. I would like to thank Paul F. Figley, Deputy Director of the
FTCA Branch of the Department of Justice, for providing the inspiration for this Note. I would
also like to thank Professor J. Alexander Tanford for his helpful comments and insights. This
Note is dedicated to my wife Kelli for her constant support and encouragement.
1. Francis Bacon, Essays, Civil and Moral, in 3 HARVARD CLASSICS pt. I (Charles W.
Elliot ed., 1910), available at http://www.bartleby.com/3I/12.html.
2. In modem texts, Bacon's reference to "Mahomet" and the "hill" are often turned into
"Mohammed" and the "mountain." See, e.g., Masat v. United States, 745 F.2d 985, 988 (5th
Cir. 1984); Manu Int'l, S.A. v. Avon Prods., Inc., 641 F.2d 62, 66 (2d Cir. 1981); Enviro Air,
Inc. v. United Air Specialists, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 633, 635 (S.D. Ohio 1970).
3. CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 216, at 346 (John W. Strong
ed., 5th ed. 1999).
4. See ROBERT S. HUNTER, FEDERAL TRIAL HANDBOOK-CIVIL § 43:1 (4th ed. 2003) ("A
view is a procedure sometimes followed in the trial of a case wherein the jury goes to the site of
an occurrence that is important in the trial of the case."); MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 216, at
346 ("Venturing forth to observe places or objects which are material to litigation but which
cannot feasibly be brought, or satisfactorily reproduced, within the courtroom, is termed a
'view."). It should be stated here that, for purposes of this Note, and except where otherwise
noted, a reference to a view refers to all types of views, whether in criminal or civil cases, and
whether in a bench trial or a jury trial. A few jurisdictions may distinguish their treatment of
views according to these distinctions. See State v. Slorah, 106 A. 768, 772 (Me. 1919) (noting
that in criminal cases, to receive testimony in any form during a view is reversible error);
ROBERT E. JONES ET AL., RUTrER GROUP PRACTICE GUIDE: FEDERAL CIVIL TRIALS AND EVIDENCE,
§§ 8:745-46 (2003) (comparing views in bench trials to jury views). However, the differences
do not typically involve the evidentiary effect of a view, and are therefore beyond the scope of
this Note. See Barnett v. Commonwealth, 403 S.W.2d 40, 45 (Ky. 1966) (noting that with
regard to evidentiary effect, there is no reason for any difference between civil and criminal
proceedings); State v. Pauline, 60 P.3d 306, 323 n. 15 (Haw. 2002) ("Our discussion regarding
views applies to all viewings, whether by the judge or by the jury."). In addition, there is much
support for the proposition that no distinction should be made among these types of views. See,
eg., 4 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 1163, 1169
(Chadbourn rev. 1972 & Supp. 1989) (stating that, in a bench trial, the "judge may have a view,
just as the jury might," as long as the judge "observe[s] the usual rules of fairness for a jury
view"); United States v. Walls, 443 F.2d 1220, 1223 (6th Cir. 1971) (noting that principles of
judge view and jury view are the same); United States v. Harris, 141 F. Supp. 418, 419 (S.D.
Cal. 1955) ("That this was not a criminal case tried in a Federal Court is not important for it
deals with the very nature of evidence.").
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the advent of the jury trial.5 However, courts are divided regarding the evidentiary
value that is to be accorded a view.6 Some jurisdictions take the position that views are
always to be accorded full evidentiary status.7 Other jurisdictions maintain that views
never provide evidence themselves, but are merely a context in which to understand the
evidence that has been or will be introduced at trial. 8 Still other jurisdictions take a
middle road, stating that views may provide evidence in some, but not all,
circumstances.
9
Although there is uncertainty as to which side constitutes the majority,10 this Note
argues that a view provides evidence similar to any other piece of real evidence, and
just as with any other piece of real evidence, the weight that should be accorded the
evidence obtained from a view will vary with the circumstances. Part I of this Note will
provide a brief overview of views. Part II will summarize where courts stand today
regarding the evidentiary effect of the view. Part III will analyze Snyder v.
Massachusetts," the most frequently cited Supreme Court case relating to this issue.
Part IV will demonstrate that a view should always be considered a source of evidence
and will consider the evidentiary weight that should be accorded a view. Finally, Part
V will discuss the practical implications that a court's position on this issue may have.
I. INTRODUCTION TO A VIEW
A. General Characteristics
When the object in question cannot be brought into a courtroom because of physical
limitations or inconvenience, a trier of fact may leave the courtroom and make an
5. 4 WIOMORE, supra note 4, § 1162; see also T. W. HUGHES, AN ILLUSTRATED TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, pt. 3, ch. 1, § 4, at 166 (1907).
6. See JOHN M. MAGUIRE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 141 (1973) (noting that
courts are divided on the question); 75 Am. JUR. 2D Trial § 264; United States v. Suarez, 846 F.
Supp. 892, 894 (D. Guam 1994) ("There has long been a debate in the case as to whether a
'view' constitutes independent evidence.").
7. See, e.g., Lillie v. United States, 953 F.2d 1188, 1190 (10th Cir. 1992).
8. See, e.g., Simmons v. State, 717 N.E.2d 635, 639 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
9. See, e.g., Price Bros. Co. v. Phila. Gear Corp., 649 F.2d 416, 419 (6th Cir. 1981).
10. Compare United States v. Gray, 199 F.3d 547,549 (1st Cir. 1999) ("Although our
[previous] unconditional statement .. that a jury view does not itself constitute or generate
evidence may represent the majority position....") (internal quotations and citations omitted),
with Barron v. United States, 818 A.2d 987 (D.C. 2003) ("[Mlost courts now characterize jury
views as evidence."). While at least one court did change its position on the matter during the
intervening time between Gray and Barron, see State v. Pauline, 60 P.3d 306,325 (Haw. 2002),
it is greatly doubted that the position of the majority actually changed between 1999 and 2003.
See also 4 WIGMORE, supra note 4, §1168, at 388 ("The theory that a jury's view does not
involve the obtaining of evidence ... has in most jurisdictions been repudiated."); McCoRMICK,
supra note 3, § 216, at 347 ("[P]robably a majority [ofjurisdictions] holds that a view is not
itself evidence."); 1 KEVIN F. O'MALLEY ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS §
5.17 (5th ed. 2000 Supp. 2003) ("Ordinarily, when the jury takes a view the court explicitly
instructs them that they are not to consider what they see as evidence in the case .... ).
11. 291 U.S. 97 (1934), overruled in part by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
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official visit to the location of the object or site in question.12 Virtually all jurisdictions
have statutory laws that permit courts to conduct views, but it is often said that even in
the absence of statutory permission, the courts would have inherent power to conduct
such views.13 In addition, at least one court indicated that the Federal Rules of
Evidence authorize a view of a location in question,1 4 although this assertion is
questioned. 15 Regardless of whence a court's authorization to conduct a view is
derived, the ability of the court to conduct a view is virtually universally
acknowledged. 16
Views may be disruptive and expensive, and are becoming less common,17
particularly as technology advances to bring accurate representations of objects and
locations into a courtroom.' 8 Thus, when computer animations, video, audio, and
photographs are adequate, a view, with the time and expense that it requires, is
disfavored.19 However, despite all of the technological advances that have come about
in recent years, views may still serve a valuable purpose to fact-finders. Sensations that
are not easily reproduced in a courtroom, such as smell and touch, may be useful to the
determination of a case.20 In addition, views may be helpful to a fact-finder where
photographs, video, audio, computer imaging, and other aids are inadequate or
misleading. 21 Although it has been stated that views are "often time-consuming,
'
,
22
views may actually save a significant amount of time in the trial.23
12. 4 WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 1162; see also Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc.,
251 F.3d 1252, 1266-67 (9th Cir. 2001).
13. McCoRMICK, supra note 3, § 216, at 346; see also 4 WIGMORE, supra note 4, §
1163, at 362, 367.
14. See Johnson v. William C. Ellis & Sons Iron Works, Inc., 604 F.2d 950, 957-58
(5th Cir. 1979).
15. 22 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 5176 (1978 & Supp. 2003).
16. See HUGHES, supra note 5, pt II, § 9, at 169; see also 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra
note 15, § 5176 n.4 ("[T]he cases... all assume that a view may properly be taken .... ").
17. TANFORD, J. ALEXANDER, THE TRIAL PROCESS: LAW, TACTICS, ANDETHICS 62 (3d ed.
2002).
18. See I O'MALLEY, ET AL., supra note 10 (noting that, in ordinary cases, photographs
and plats are often adequate).
19. See 3 BURR W. JONES, JONES ON EVIDENCE, CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 15:22, at 58
(Spencer A. Gard ed., 6th ed. 1972).
20. See, for example, a case reported to have been filed in the summer of 2003, in which
two people suffered burns in a hot spring in Nevada. The newspaper report of the story noted
that "the heat of the springs can be felt standing beside them." Mark Vanderhoff, Warning:
Wilderness, RENO GAZETrE-JOURNAL, August 21, 2002, available at
http://www.rgj.com/news/stories/htmUl2002/08/21/22036.php.
21. See, e.g., Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1266 (9th Cir.
2001) ("If a picture is worth a thousand words, then the real thing is worth a thousand
pictures."); Rygg v. County of Maui, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1147 (D. Haw. 2000) ("The site
visit gave the Court a much better perspective of the entire park and beach... than was depicted
by the photographs and video, especially because the park area is actually much more compact
than depicted in the photographs and video."); Clarke v. Bruckner, 93 F.R.D. 666,671 (D.V.I.
1982) ("No number of photographs or drawings could give the jury as truthful a picture of the
scene as a visit to the site."); United States v. Skinner, 425 F.2d 552, 555 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
20051 1093
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The decision of whether to conduct a view is left to the informed discretion of the
trial judge.24 While the discretion of a trial judge in this respect is broad,25 courts and
commentators have listed several factors that may play a role in the judge's
consideration: the adequacy of other evidence such as testimony and visual aids, 26 the
centrality of the object or site to be viewed to the litigation,27 whether there has been a
substantial change in the condition of the site or object,28 the amount of time that a
view would require, 29 the expenses that would be incurred as a result of the view,30 the
distance from the court of the location to be viewed,3' the inconvenience that would be
caused by the view,32 the additional clarity to be gained from the view, 33 and the risk of
prejudicial effect from the view.34
B. The History of the View
1. The Early History of the View
Views have been recognized as an appropriate procedure since the beginning of the
jury trials.35 The power to conduct a view was considered at common law to be a part
of the court's inherent power, although statutory regulation of the procedural details
(stating that a demonstration "vividly portrayed that essential third dimension which a picture
lacks").
22. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 216, at 346.
23. Hulen D. Wendorf, Some Views on Jury Views, 15 BAYLOR L. REV. 379, 384 (1963)
("The clarification of the issues effected by a view may often actually save a great deal of
time.").
24. United States v. Harris, 141 F. Supp. 418, 419 n.1 (S.D. Cal. 1955) (listing a
number of cases that discuss the broad discretion of the trial judge in granting or denying a
view); MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 216, at 346.
25. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 216, at 346.
26. See, e.g., United States v. Marler, 583 F. Supp. 1456, 1460 (D. Mass. 1984) (view
was unnecessary in light of government's schematic drawings and photographs, in conjunction
with testimony); TANFORD, supra note 17, at 62.
27.2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN &MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, §
403.07[4] (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2003).
28. See, e.g., Bundy v. Dugger, 850 F.2d 1402, 1422 (11th Cir. 1988) (significant
alteration to the scene listed as one of the reasons for affirming the trial judge's denial of the
defendant's request for a view); TANFORD, supra note 17, at 62.
29. See Wendorf, supra note 23, at 390.
30. Id.
31. Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Bass, 684 F.2d 764, 769 (11 th Cir. 1982) (holding that the
trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying a view where, among other concerns, the
location to be viewed was 30-35 miles away).
32. Holmes v. Combs, 90 N.E.2d 822, 824 (Ind. App. 1956) (no abuse of discretion in
denying a view where the "weather was bad").
33. State v. Stewart, 360 N.W.2d 430,432 (Minn. App. 1985) (trial court did not abuse
its discretion in denying view where it determined that a view would not be helpful to the jury).
34. JONES ET AL., supra note 4, § 8:721.
35.4 WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 1162; Waddell v. State, 501 A.2d 865, 867 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1985).
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has existed in England for over 250 years.36 Historically, in English practice, a view
could be demanded by either party.37 However, the Statute of Anne, enacted in 1710,
explicitly vested in the trial court discretion over whether to conduct a view.38 Under
the Statute of Anne, views were conducted before the trial, and by only a portion of the
jurors. 39 The view was originally limited to real property actions,4° but was later
extended to encompass a wider variety of actions.'
2. The History of Views in America
In the United States, the authority to conduct views began as a common-law power
that was inherent in the courts. 2 Initially, views were almost always granted upon the
request of either party.43 They have since come to be seen as a matter within the trial
judge's discretion,44 although "the practice is now very generally, if not universally,
regulated by statutes." '' The types of actions in which views were allowed were limited
46in the past, but most current statutes do not limit the types of actions in which a view
can be conducted or the type of property that can be viewed.47
The assault on the evidentiary value of views came about when courts began to
question the general use of real evidence, 48 since such evidence could not be
incorporated into the record for appellate review.49 As a result, some courts completely
36. 4 WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 1163; Note, View by a Judge Sitting in Lieu of a Jury,
59 W. VA. L. REV. 379, 381 (1957).
37. 4 WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 1163.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. "Real" actions are those actions relating to land, as distinguished from personal
actions, which are based on a personal right. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 34 (8th ed. 2004).
41. 3 JONES, supra note 19, § 15:20.
42. Springer v. Chicago, 26 N.E. 514, 517 (Ill. 1891).
43. Polk's Lessee v. Minner, 1 Del. Cas. 59, 1 (1795) ("As to the view, I think the
granting of views here has been upon more general principles; granting of views here is of
course, but not so in England, for they are not granted there but upon sufficient cause shown,
and I think they are often improperly granted here in cases where it is not necessary.").
44. 4 WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 1164; see also Gonzalez-Perez v. Gomez-Aguila, 296
F. Supp. 117, 119 (D.P.R. 2003) (holding that trial judge has inherent power to decide whether
to allow a jury view at all).
45. JONES, supra note 19, § 15:21.
46. Id. § 15:20, at 53.
47. Id. § 15:21, at 55.
48. Real evidence is physical evidence that "plays a direct part in the incident in
question." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 599 (8th ed. 2004). It overlaps with and is sometimes
used synonymously with "demonstrative evidence." Id. at 596. Real evidence is also sometimes
called "autoptic proference," although Wigmore argues that the two should be distinguished. 4
WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 1150. Hughes makes a distinction between immediate real evidence,
or autoptic proference (that is, evidence that is perceived directly by the court without witness
testimony), and reported real evidence (where the existence of the evidence is conveyed by a
witness or documents), HUGHES, supra note 5, § 1. According to Hughes, the term "real
evidence" has come to be synonymous with "immediate real evidence." Id. at § 2.
49. 1 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 13 (John Henry
Wigmore ed., 16th ed. 1899) ("In one or two jurisdictions the notion has of late obtained a
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excluded all real evidence as a method of proof 50 Although this doctrine was
eventually repudiated,5' it left behind a remnant: in repudiating the doctrine, some
courts declared that views were not evidence, effectively evading the objection that
views could not be accurately preserved for appellate review.5 2 These courts stated that
the purpose of views is "to enable the jury, by the view ... to better understand and
comprehend the testimony of the witnesses respecting the same, and thereby the more
intelligently to apply the testimony[,] not to make them silent witnesses in the case."53
Thus, two paths began to diverge, one in which courts held that a view constituted
independent evidence and the other in which courts held that a view was simply meant
to form a context that would aid the jury in understanding the evidence that had been or
would be introduced.
5 4
II. THE CURRENT POSITIONS OF COURTS
Today, courts are split on the issue of whether a view is treated as evidence,5 5 and it
can be difficult to precisely pin down their position.5 6 The positions taken by the courts
today are: (1) a view is never independent evidence, but is intended solely to provide a
context in which to apply the evidence produced during the trial; (2) a view may or
may not be independent evidence, depending on the situation; and (3) a view is always
independent evidence.
footing that autoptic proference is to be excluded as a method of proof because it is impossible
to transmit... on appeal .. "); HUGHES, supra note 5, § 10.
50. 1 GREENLEAF, supra note 49, HUGHES, supra note 5, § 10.
51. 1 GREENLEAF, supra note 49.
52. Id.; HUGHES, supra note 5, § 10.
53. Close v. Samm, 27 Iowa 503, 505 (1869).
54. See 4 WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 1168, at 385-88.
55. Lillie v. United States, 953 F.2d 1188, 1190 (10th Cir. 1992) ("We acknowledge
that jurisdictions vary as to whether a view is treated as evidence .. "); 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trial §
264 (1992 & Supp. 2003); 5 ROBERT A. BARKER & VINCENT C. ALEXANDER, NEW YORK
PRACTICE SERIES § 11:22 (Supp. 2003).
56. See 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 15, § 5176 n.6 (noting "how difficult it can
be to pin down the position of any court on this question" and that "[tihe position of federal
courts is unclear"); Thomas P. Hardeman, The Evidentiary Effect of a View: Stare Decisis or
Stare Dictis?, 53 W. VA. L. REv. 103 [hereinafter Evidentiary Effect] (discussing lack of clarity
of the West Virginia decisions); Thomas P. Hardeman, The Evidentiary Effect of a View-
Another Word, 58 W. VA. L. REv. 69, 73 [hereinafter Another Word] (noting the "seeming
inconsistencies" in West Virginia cases). The Supreme Court appears to have had difficulty
determining the position of the Massachusetts courts in Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97
(1934), with the majority stating that the "Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has said of a
view that its chief purpose is to enable the jury to understand better the testimony which has or
may be introduced," id. at 121 (internal quotations omitted), and the dissent arguing that "[i]n
Massachusetts, what the jury observes in the course of a view is evidence in the case," id. at 125
(Scalia, J., dissenting). It is probably this lack of clarity regarding the positions of a number of
jurisdictions that leads to the uncertainty regarding which position represents the majority of
jurisdictions. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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A. The Position That a View Is Not Evidence
A significant number of states take the position that a view is not evidence.57 For
example, in Gilbert v. City of Caldwell,5 8 the court was asked to reverse its previous
positions and "adopt the approach that a view may constitute evidence."59 The court
did not reverse its position, noting that "a view is not characterized as evidence
because ... it cannot be included in the record.' 60 The court admitted, however, that
the logic of this objection had been questioned. 61 Similarly, the court in State v.
Overkamp stated that a "'view cannot replace testimony; the visual observations of the
trier cannot be substituted for testimony; and the only legitimate purpose of an
inspection is to illustrate the evidence and provide a base for understanding and
comprehending testimony upon the record."' 62
57. For example, there is authority in the following states that a view does not constitute
evidence: Arkansas, Potter v. Bryan Funeral Home, 817 S.W.2d 882, 884 (Ark. 1991); Florida,
McCollum v. State, 74 So. 2d 74, 76 (Fla. 1954); Idaho, State v. McClurg, 300 P. 898, 911
(Idaho 1931), overruled on other grounds by State v. McMahan, 65 P.2d 156 (Idaho 1937);
Indiana, Simmons v. State, 717 N.E.2d 635, 639 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) ("Ajury's view of a place
is not intended as evidence .. "); Iowa, State v. Hicks, 277 N.W.2d 889, 893 (Iowa 1979);
Kentucky, Barnett v. Commonwealth, 403 S.W.2d 40,44-45 (Ky. 1966) ("[A] jury view is not
to be equated with the reception of evidence...."); Louisiana, Cox v. Moore, 805 So. 2d 277,
281 (La. App. 2001); Minnesota, Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Sun Ins. Office, 88 N.W.
272, 273 (Minn. 1901); Nevada, Love v. Mt. Oddie United Mines Co., 184 P. 921, 926 (Nev.
1919) ("It is the rule in this state that a view cannot be considered as evidence ...."); New
Jersey, State v. Coleman, 214 A.2d 393, 398 (N.J. 1965); Ohio, State v. Richey, 595 N.E.2d
915, 927 (Ohio 1992); Oregon, Crane v. Oregon R.R. & Navigation Co., 133 P. 810, 814 (Or.
1913); Pennsylvania, Avins v. Commonwealth, 108 A.2d 788,790 (Pa. 1954); Rhode Island, In
re Blackstone Valley Dist. Comm'n, 490 A.2d 974, 975 (R.I. 1985) (an eminent domain case);
South Carolina, State v. Mouzon, 485 S.E.2d 918,920-21 (S.C. 1997); South Dakota, Beatty v.
Depue, 103 N.W.2d 187, 190 (S.D. 1960); Washington, State v. Bernson, 700 P.2d 758, 767
(Wash. Ct. App. 1985); and Wisconsin, Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Shannon, 356 N.W.2d 175,
179 (Wis. 1984).
58. 732 P.2d 355 (Idaho App. 1987). In Gilbert, which was a land damages case, the
trial court took a view, which the court, in its findings, characterized as evidence. Id. at 366-67.
The Gilberts, appealing from the amount awarded as damages, argued to the court of appeals
that the judge erred in this characterization. Id. at 367. The court of appeals affirmed, stating
that this characterization was error, but that it was harmless because "if we disregard that
'evidence' there otherwise remains substantial and competent evidence to support the trial
court's findings." Id.
59. Id. at 366-67.
60. Id. at 367.
61. Id.
62. 865 S.W.2d 376, 378 (Mo. App. 1993) (quoting Koplar v. State Tax Commission,
321 S.W.2d 686, 696 (Mo. 1959)). In Overkamp, the defendant, convicted of "failing to keep a
proper lookout" while driving a vehicle, appealed the conviction based on the fact that the judge
characterized the view as evidence. Id. at 377. However, the appellate court concluded that
sufficient evidence aside from the view existed, so that the error was harmless. Id. at 378.
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Very few federal courts take the position that a view is never evidence. Although
one district court did hold that a view could never constitute evidence, 63 the court was
located in the Sixth Circuit, which has since ruled that views may sometimes be used as
evidence. 64 The Seventh Circuit may accept the proposition that views are not
evidence, although it has not specifically held this. In EEOC v. Mercy Hospital,6s the
Seventh Circuit stated that views are certainly proper when taken "for the purpose of
weighing the testimony of witnesses and to better understand the evidence submitted at
trial, 66 but it expressly avoided the question of whether a view could ever be used as
substantive evidence.
67
In EEOC, there was a dispute as to the difficulty of operating several pieces of
equipment. The judge took a view so that he could "go and do a hands-on examination
of these machines," and "carefully explained that the sole purpose of his view was to
better understand the testimony of hospital employees concerning the degree of
difficulty involved in operating various pieces of equipment." 68 Thejudge then went to
the hospital and personally operated the equipment. Although one may be hard-pressed
to imagine a situation in which such an experience plays no role whatsoever in the
judge's conclusions as to the difficulty of operating the equipment,69 the trial judge's
statement that he did not consider the view as evidence was enough to convince the
Seventh Circuit. It stated that the district court "considered its observation only for the
purpose of weighing the testimony of witnesses and to better understand the evidence
submitted at trial. Clearly it was proper for the district court to have considered its
observations for such a limited purpose. 70
B. Positions That a View May Be Evidence
Some courts take the position that views may sometimes constitute evidence and
sometimes may not. Some state courts distinguish between views in eminent domain
63. Park-in Theatres v. Ochs, 75 F. Supp. 506, 511 (S.D. Ohio 1948) ("When a jury
views the premises the court explicitly instructs them that they are not to consider what they see
as evidence in the case.").
64. Price Bros. v. Phila. Gear Corp., 649 F.2d 416 (6th Cir. 1981).
65. 709 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir. 1983).
66. Id. at 1200.
67. Id. In Vector Pipeline, L.P. v. 68.55Acres of Land, 157 F. Supp. 2d 949,955 (N.D.
Ill. 2001), a district court in the Seventh Circuit concluded that a view could be substantive
evidence. The court based this conclusion on the Seventh Circuit's "favorabl[e]" citation of In
re Application to Take Testimony, 102 F.R.D. 521, 524 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), in Devin v. DeTella,
101 F.3d 1206, 1209 n.2 (7th Cir. 1996). Vector Pipeline, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 955. However, the
Seventh Circuit's citation to In re Application was not favorable, but the case was instead simply
mentioned in a footnote as a case that was cited by the petitioner, and one that "hardly
support[ed] petitioner's claim of evolving consensus in support of an accused's absolute
constitutional right to be present at a jury view." Devin, 101 F.3d at 1209 n.2.
68. Id. at 1199.
69. See infra notes 139-43 and accompanying text regarding the practical effect of an
instruction that a view is not considered evidence.
70. EEOC, 709 F.2d at 1200.
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cases and other views,' others distinguish between "evidentiary" and "non-evidentiary
views, '72 and others are somewhat ambiguous.73 At least one state seems to lean
toward avoiding views altogether.74
The First Circuit intimated that views may sometimes provide independent evidence
and at other times cannot. In Clemente v. Carnicon-Puerto Rico Management.
Assocs. , the court stated without discussion that "the rule in this circuit is that a view
does not itself constitute or generate evidence. 76 However, four years later, in United
States v. Gray,77 the First Circuit took the position that views may sometimes constitute
independent evidence.78 In Gray, a criminal defendant's motion for a view was
granted, and the defendant objected to the court's instruction that the view was not
evidence in the case. 79 The First Circuit, although it found that the instruction was not
prejudicial, agreed with the defendant's assertion that its previous position was
incorrect by contemporary standards. 80 Although the First Circuit specifically noted
that it was going no further than to remove the blanket prohibition against treating
views as sources of evidence,"1 much of its rhetoric indicates that it believes that a view
will always constitute the taking of evidence.
82
The Sixth Circuit weighed in on the issue in Price Bros. v. Philadelphia Gear
Corp.83 There, the court stated that where a view is used as evidence in a case,
71. E.g., Chicago v. Koff, 173 N.E. 666, 667-68 (Ill. 1930); Reed v. Cent. Maine
Power Co., 172 At]. 823, 825 (Me. 1934).
72. Some states that have taken this position are: Colorado, Zambakian v. Leson, 246 P.
268, 269-70 (Colo. 1926) (stating that a view is not evidence unless the fact is an "absolute
physical one"); Georgia, Hensley v. Henry, 541 S.E.2d 398, 402 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000)
(distinguishing between "evidentiary" views and "scene" views); and Virginia, P. Lorillard Co.
v. Clay, 104 S.E. 384, 387 (Va. 1920) (noting that in some cases, a view aids the jury in the
application of testimony and in others, a view furnishes a distinctly additional source of proof).
73. Massachusetts has stated that a view is not evidence in the "strict and narrow sense
of the word," but that it may be used by the jury in reaching a verdict. Commonwealth v.
Jefferson, 635 N.E.2d 2, 5 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994).
74. Texas has "denounced" views, Jones v. State, 843 S.W.2d 487, 499 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1992), and Texas courts look upon the view with a "peculiar horror." Mauricio v. State,
104 S.W.3d 919, 921-22 (Tex. App. 2003) (arguing, however, that a view is sometimes
appropriate and calling for a change in Texas law).
75. 52 F.3d 383 (lst Cir. 1995).
76. Id. at 386. However, the court cited no previous opinion that had established the
rule in that circuit. See id.
77. 199 F.3d 547 (1st Cir. 1999).
78. Id. at 548 ("Our review of the relevant case law and commentary now leads us to
conclude that it is unrealistic to exclude a view from the status of evidence in every
circumstance. We do not go further in this opinion than to remove the blanket prohibition.").
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 548-49 (discussing the positions of the "experts" that a view should be treated
as any other evidence, stating that they found "no reason to disagree with the experts," and
noting that the practical effect of a view is that of evidence).
83. 649 F.2d 416 (6th Cir. 1981).
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procedural safeguards must be taken, but where the view is only to "assist the fact
finder," safeguards are less important.
84
In Price Bros., the defendant was the manufacturer of some components in a
machine used by the plaintiff. Without the knowledge or consent of the parties, the trial
judge sent his law clerk to the plaintiff's business to view the machine in operation.
85
On a prior appeal, because the record was void of any reference to the visit, the Sixth
Circuit remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the clerk actually
visited the plant and, "[m]ost importantly, . whether the trip, if made, was at the
direction of the trial judge. 86 After the evidentiary hearing, the Sixth Circuit stated that
the presumption of prejudice from off-the-record fact gathering was overcome by the
undisputed testimony at the evidentiary hearing because "[t]he law clerk's testimony
and the statement of the trial judge establish that the sole purpose of the clerk's trip
was.., to understand the evidence to be produced at trial. There is no indication that
the trial judge considered the law clerk's report as evidence ... ., The court
continued:
Where the purpose of a view is to assist the fact-finder.. .and the view itself is not
considered as evidence, then the potential for prejudice to a party not present at a
view is minimized. In contrast, where the fact-finder's observations upon a view
are used as evidence to determine the facts, then the procedural safeguards of a
trial ... must apply.
88
Judge Merritt, concurring with the decision on other grounds, understandably
stated that he would have required a "more forceful and conclusive showing" that
there was no prejudicial error.89 The majority holding in Price Bros. essentially
permits trial judges to order views on their own initiative, without notification to the
parties and without providing the parties opportunity to attend.90 Under Price Bros.,
as long as the judge makes clear in the record that his view was not for the purpose
of providing evidence or, in the case of a jury trial, instructs the jury to the same
effect, any error created by the view is considered harmless. This is an especially
inapposite result when one considers that an earlier Sixth Circuit case, in avoiding a
determination on the issue, stated, "however a view is characterized, 'its inevitable
effect is that of evidence."'
91
84. Id. at 419.
85. Id. at 420.
86. Price Bros. v. Phila. Gear Corp., 629 F.2d 444, 447 (6th Cir. 1980). Note that this is
slightly different from the Sixth Circuit's later assertion that it had remanded to determine
whether the visit was at the direction of the trial judge and "most importantly, what use the trial
judge made in deciding the case of whatever the law clerk had observed." Price Bros., 649 F.2d
at 420.
87. Price Bros., 649 F.2d at 420.
88. Id. at 419.
89. Id. at 424-25.
90. See infra notes 220-25 and accompanying text.
91. United States v. Walls, 443 F.2d 1220, 1223 (6th Cir. 1971) (quoting Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 121 (1934) (finding reversible error in taking a view without
presence of the criminal defendant or counsel)).
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C. The Position That a View Is Evidence
The current trend on this issue is to consider views as evidence. 92 While one would
be hard-pressed to find any cases from recent years where a court changed its position
to hold that a view cannot constitute evidence, 93 there are some cases in which the
opposite is true. 94 Some state courts hold to the position that a view is independent
evidence, 95 but this appears to be the minority position among those state courts that
have explicitly spoken to the issue.
The majority of federal courts hold that a view is independent evidence, although
the reasoning of the federal courts varies. 96 The Second Circuit,
97 the Ninth Circuit,98
92. United States v. Gray, 199 F.3d 547, 548 (1 st Cir. 1999); JONES ET AL., supra note
4, § 8:745.
93. There are examples of recent decisions in which courts maintained their position
that a jury view cannot be considered evidence, e.g., Simmons v. State, 717 N.E.2d 635, 639
(Ind. Ct. App. 1999); State v. Mouzon, 485 S.E.2d 918, 920-21 (S.C. 1997), but there do not
seem to be any recent decisions reversing course to come into this camp.
94. E.g., United States v. Gray, 199 F.3d 547, 548 (1st Cir. 1999); State v. Pauline, 60
P.3d 306, 322-25 (Haw. 2002).
95. Among these are: Alabama, W. Ry. of Ala. v. Still, 352 So. 2d 1092, 1097 (Ala.
1977); Alaska, Bowlin v. State, 823 P.2d 676, 678 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991); Arizona, State v.
Martin, 489 P.2d 254,256 (Ariz. 1971); California, Vaughn v. Dekreek, 83 Cal. Rptr. 144, 148
(Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (view constituted "independent and substantial evidence"); Connecticut,
MeGar v. Bristol, 42 A. 1000, 1001 (Conn. 1899); Hawaii, State v. Pauline, 60 P.3d 306, 322-
27 (Haw. 2002) (thoroughly reviewing the various positions taken on the subject); Kansas, City
of Topeka v. Martineau, 22 P. 419, 420 (Kan. 1889); Nebraska, Stull v. Dept. of Rds &
Irrigation, 263 N.W. 148, 149 (Neb. 1935); New Hampshire, Chouinard v. Shaw, 104 A.2d 522,
523 (N.H. 1954); Oklahoma, Yeager v. State, 278 P. 665, 669-70 (Okla. Crim. App. 1929);
Tennessee, Marion County v. Cantrell, 61 S.W.2d 476, 477 (Tenn. 1933) (stating that the object
of a jury view is to make clear the situation, and thus a view certainly constitutes evidence);
Utah, Harper v. Summit County, 963 P.2d 768, 780 (Utah 1998) (disapproved on other grounds
by Culbertson v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 44 P.3d 642, 657 (Utah 2001)); and West Virginia,
State v. Thomas, 374 S.E.2d 719, 722 (W. Va. 1988) ("The view offered the jury additional
significant evidence.").
96. A few of the holdings have apparently depended on the law of the forum state. See,
e.g., New Hampshire Ball Bearings v. Aetna Cas., 848 F. Supp. 1082, 1086 (D.N.H. 1994)
(citing only New Hampshire case law for the proposition that a "view can be considered as
evidence"). Others have simply relied on their own opinions. See, e.g., United States v. Harris,
141 F. Supp. 418, 419 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
97. In Leo Spear Construction Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 446 F.2d
439 (2d Cir. 1971), the court stated that "testimony, together with the Court's examination of the
site, provided a sufficient basis for the Court's conclusions." Id. at 444. The court continued,
"[i]n allowing the inspection of the site to influence its determination of value, the Court acted
properly, since in no respect did it ignore the other evidence of value . I..." d. Although an
earlier Second Circuit opinion, Schonfeld v. United States, 277 F. 934, 938 (2d Cir. 1921),
indicated that views are not evidence but are to help the jury understand the evidence, and this
opinion has never been explicitly overruled, it is hard to reconcile Schonfeld with Leo Spear.
98. The court seemed to assume in Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc., 251 F.3d
1252 (9th Cir. 2001), that a view is evidence. There, where the trial judge had taken an improper
off-the-record view, the Ninth Circuit stated that there is not "anything wrong with official
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and the D.C. Circuit99 have all indicated that a view does in fact constitute evidence.100
The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have expressly stated that views are evidence. The
Tenth Circuit, in Lillie v. United States, 01 held that views are always evidence.
Accordingly, the court stated, "[W]e disagree with the Sixth Circuit holding in Price
Bros. to the extent it indicates that a view sometimes is not evidence."1 0 2 Thus, in
Lillie,'0 3 where the judge had taken a view without notifying the parties or giving them
an opportunity to be present, the judge engaged in off-the-record fact gathering, and
the case was remanded for a new trial.
The Eleventh Circuit discussed views in the highly-publicized Ten Commandments
monument case of Glassroth v. Moore,104 where "[t]he judge unquestionably made
important factfindings as a result of what he saw when he viewed the monument and
the rotunda," and the appellant argued that such factfindings were unwarranted. 10 5 The
court agreed with the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Lillie, and stated that "[j]ust as
pictures... submitted as exhibits are evidence, so too is what the judge saw when he
viewed the actual monument and its setting."' 16
III. SNYDER
The Supreme Court's 1934 decision in Snyder v. Massachussettsi°7 is frequently
cited by those analyzing the evidentiary effect of a view.' 0 8 Interestingly, the case is
cited in support of both the theory that a view does not provide independent
evidence,' 0 9 as well as the theory that a view does constitute a source of evidence.' 10
excursions by a judge or jury to view evidence that simply cannot, because of physical
limitations, be brought into a courtroom," id. at 1266-67, and that "the court's site visit
improperly exposed him to factual evidence not part of the record." Id. at 1267.
99. In United States v. Skinner, 425 F.2d 552,555 (D.C. Cir. 1970), the court stated that
a demonstration is evidence similar to a viewing by the jury, and the appellate court is "required
to give full credit to all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom."
100. Though some other courts have spoken vaguely to the issue, the law in those
circuits is veiled. The Fourth Circuit might have implied that a view constitutes evidence in
Small v. Hunt, 98 F.3d 789, 798, when it stated, "[a] district court's use of evidentiary findings
from an improper view is reviewed under the standard governing the erroneous admission of
evidence." The Fifth Circuit's opinion in Johnson v. William C. Ellis & Sons Iron Works, Inc.,
64 F.2d 950, 957-58 (5th Cir. 1979), indicated that the Federal Rules of Evidence may govern
the admissibility of views. The Eleventh Circuit, in Brundy v. Dugger, 850 F.2d 1402, 1422
(11 th Cir. 1988), stated in a habeas case that the trial court's decision to deny the defendant's
request for a view was not an issue of state law, but was "an evidentiary ruling" that could be
grounds for habeas relief if it denied the defendant of fundamental fairness.
101. 953 F.2d 1188 (10th Cir. 1992).
102. Id. at 1190.
103. Id.
104. 335 F.3d 1282 (1 lth Cir. 2003).
105. Id. at 1289.
106. Id. at 1289-90.
107. 291 U.S. 97 (1934), overruled inpart by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
108. See, e.g., Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1289; United States v. Gray, 199 F.3d 547, 549
(1st Cir. 1999); Lillie, 953 F.2d at 1190; Barron v. United States, 818 A.2d 987, 991 (D.C.
2003); State v. Pauline, 60 P.3d 306, 323 (Haw. 2002).
109. See, e.g., State v. Merritt, 212 P.2d 706, 714 (Nev. 1949) (arguing that Snyder
recognizes that things perceived at a view would not become evidence until regularly and
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Because bits and pieces of the holding may be used out of context to support either
side of the issue, an in-depth examination of Snyder is warranted to determine what
light, if any, the case may have shed on the evidentiary value of a view.
Snyder was a 5-4 decision, with the majority opinion written by Justice Cardozo,
and a dissent authored by Justice Roberts, in which Justices Brandeis, Sutherland, and
Butler concurred. The case has since been overruled in part byMalloy v. Hogan,' but
the part of the ruling that has been overruled is at most tangential to the present
issue. 12 For present purposes, Snyder is still good law." 13
Snyder involved the prosecution and conviction of the defendant Snyder for murder
during an attempted robbery." 4 During the trial, a motion to view the crime scene was
granted, and the court, while prohibiting the defendant from attending the view in
person, allowed his counsel to accompany the jury on the view. 115 Snyder moved that
he should be allowed to attend the view, invoking constitutional grounds, but this
motion was denied." 6 During the view, both the prosecutor and Snyder's counsel
called attention to various points of interest. 117 At the close of evidence, the judge in
the case instructed the jury that "[t]he view, the testimony given by the witnesses and
the exhibits comprise the evidence that is before you."' 18 The defendant was convicted,
and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed." 9 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to decide whether Snyder was denied due process of law under the
Fourteenth Amendment when his request to accompany the jury on the view was
refused. 
1 20
factually introduced and admitted at trial), overruled on other grounds by Steward v. State, 346
P.2d 1083 (Nev. 1959); State v. Richey, 595 N.E.2d 915,927 (Ohio 1992) (citing Snyder for the
proposition that "[a] view of a crime scene is neither evidence nor a crucial stage in the
proceedings"); 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trial § 264 (1992 & Supp. 2003) (citing Snyder for the
proposition that "a jury on a view is not receiving evidence").
110. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 141 F. Supp. 418, 419 (S.D. Cal. 1955) (stating
that Snyder declared that a view of a premises is evidence); Pauline, 60 P.3d at 323 (opining
that Snyder asserted that, in reality, a view must be treated as evidence).
111. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
112. The part of the holding of Snyder later overruled was its indication that the
Fourteenth Amendment may not have reinforced certain assurances of the Bill of Rights. See id.
at 6 (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment extends the scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege
to include protection from states). However, for purposes of addressing the issues, the Court
assumed that the Fourteenth Amendment did reinforce the Bill of Rights as against the states.
See Snyder, 291 U.S. at 105-06.
113. See Devin v. DeTella, 101 F.3d 1206, 1209 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[W]e believe that the
holding of Snyder is equally valid today."); United States ex rel. Devin v. Godinez, No. 93-C-
6649, 1996 WL 148038, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 1996) ("Snyder is still good law"). Courts
have questioned the validity of Snyder. See United States v. Walls, 443 F.2d 1220, 1223 n.3
(6th Cir. 1971); In re Application to Take Testimony in Criminal Case Outside Dist., 102 F.R.D.
521, 524 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), but the Supreme Court has not yet explicitly overruled this portion
of the case.
114. 291 U.S. at 102.
115. Id. at 103.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 103-04.
118. Id. at 104.
119. Id. at 102-03.
120. Id. at 103.
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The Court assumed that the Fourteenth Amendment conferred to those being tried in
state proceedings the benefits that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment
conferred to those being tried in federal proceedings, 12 1 and noted that the
Confrontation Clause is subject to exceptions. 22 The Court also stated that, for
Fourteenth Amendment due process purposes, it was first necessary to determine
whether Snyder's presence at the view was a requirement for him to obtain a fair
trial.'
23
First, the Court considered whether there could be a fair hearing if a defendant were
absent from a view "where nothing is said by any one to direct the attention of the jury
to one feature or another."1 24 It concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment (and thus,
the Sixth Amendment) does not assure the right to be present at such a view, since
"[t]here is nothing he could do if he were there, and almost nothing he could gain."1 25
The Court next turned to views where counsel are permitted, without any comment on
the evidence, to point out to the jury particular features of the scene. 26 The Court
concluded that, "[flar from being harmful, [the fact that counsel pointed out various
features] supplies an additional assurance that nothing helpful to either side will be
overlooked upon the view."'
12 7
Contrary to the implication of at least one commentator, 128 the Snyder Court's
conclusion that the defendant did not have a constitutional right to attend the view in
no way hinged upon whether the view in the case was termed "evidence."' 29 Rather, it
hinged upon the Court's conclusion that a view is not part of a "trial" in the common
law sense of the word, so that a defendant's Sixth Amendment right does not apply to a
view.' 30 Some courts have held that the question of whether a view is part of a trial
121. Id. at 105-06. Some courts have implied that if the defendant's presence at a view
is not guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause, then it must be the case that its "sole purpose...
is to enable the jurors to more accurately understand and more fully appreciate the testimony of
witnesses given before them." People v. Thorn, 50 N.E. 947, 951 (N.Y. 1898). However, it does
not necessarily have to be one or the other. Wigmore argues that the Confrontation Clause was
meant to apply to the taking of testimonial evidence, in order to secure opportunity for cross-
examination, which is not an issue during a view. 6 WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 1803, at 341-42.
122. Snyder, 291 U.S. at 107.
123. Id. at 107-08.
124. Id. at 108.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 110.
127. Id. at 113.
128. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 216 n.1 (stating that the Snyder Court carefully
limited its holding to the facts of that case, including "the fact that a view is not deemed
evidence in Massachusetts").
129. Snyder, 291 U.S. at 113.
130. Id. However, a number of state courts have concluded that a view is part of a trial
in their respective states. See, e.g., Noell v. Commonwealth, 115 S.E. 679, 682 (Va. 1923)
(stating that "in jurisdictions where it has been looked upon as equivalent to taking evidence, the
courts have generally held [that a view is part of the trial]"), overruled on other grounds by
Jones v. Commonwealth, 317 S.E.2d 482 (Va. 1984); see also State v. Rogers, 177 N.W. 358,
359 (Minn. 1920) (stating that several courts have held that a view is part of the trial because it
is ordered by the court). Whether the holding of Snyder on this issue makes good policy is
beyond the scope of this Note.
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depends upon whether it is to be evidence in the case.' 3' The Supreme Court, however,
indicated in Snyder that these issues are unrelated for purposes of the Federal
Constitution.132 Thus, the Court stated, "[w]e may assume that the knowledge derived
from an inspection of the scene may be characterized as evidence. Even if this be so, a
view is not a 'trial' nor any part of a trial in the sense in which a trial was understood at
common law."'
' 33
The Court went on to say that, while a "defendant in a criminal case must be present
at a trial when evidence is offered,"' 134 "the solution of the problem is not to be found in
dictionary definitions of evidence or trials,"'1 35 since the tyranny of labels is a "fertile
source of perversion in constitutional theory."' 36 The Court concluded its discussion of
this issue by stating:
We find it of no moment that the judge in this case described the view as evidence.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has said of a view that its chief
purpose is to enable the jury to understand better the testimony which has or may
be introduced. Even so, its inevitable effect is that of evidence, no matter what
label the judge may choose to give it. Such is the holding of many well-considered
cases.
137
In the end, the Court concluded that the exclusion of the defendant from the view
did not violate his constitutional rights:
The least a defendant must do, if he would annul the practice upon a view which
the Commonwealth has approved by the judgment of its courts, is to show that in
the particular case in which the practice is exposed to challenge there is a
reasonable possibility that injustice has been done. No one can have even a
131. See, e.g., State v. Slorah, 106 A. 768, 772 (Me. 1919) (stating that conflicting
opinions as to whether the accused has a right to be present at a view arise, at least in part, from
differing conceptions as to the purpose of the view); Rogers, 177 N.W. at 359 (stating that
courts that hold that a view is part of a trial also hold that it is the taking of evidence); Noell,
115 S.E. at 682 (stating that the question of whether a view is part of a trial hinges upon whether
a view is a source of evidence, and that "it is never questioned that if evidence is taken during
the view in the prisoner's absence, he cannot be convicted"). Corpus Juris Secondum states that
some authorities hold, on the grounds that a view is not the taking of evidence and not part of a
trial, that the accused has no right to be present during a view. 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1162
(1989 & Supp. 2003).
132. It is clear that the Snyder Court did not perceive its ruling that a view is not a part
of a trial within the constitutional sense to compel a finding that a view is not evidence, see
Snyder, 291 U.S. at 113, nor, presumably, would an opposite ruling have compelled them to
hold that a view is evidence. See id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 114. It is this concept that is often used by courts that consider views as
evidence to require, barring extreme circumstances, a criminal defendant's presence at a view, or
by courts that do not consider a view as evidence to justify the taking of a view in the absence of
a criminal defendant. See supra note 131.
135. Id. at 115.
136. Id. at 114.
137. Id. at 121 (internal citations omitted).
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passing thought that the presence of Snyder would have been an aid to his
defense.138
IV. VIEWS SHOULD ALWAYS BE CONSIDERED EVIDENCE
A view should always be considered evidence. The arguments that are advanced in
favor of this position are logical and in keeping with common sense. In addition, the
arguments that are advanced to support the position that a view cannot be evidence are
outdated and subject to a number of valid criticisms. However, while a view should
always be considered evidence, its evidentiary value should never become
disproportionate to the other evidence that is introduced.
A. Reasons That Views Should Be Considered Evidence
The strongest argument that a view should be considered evidence is pragmatic. The
"inevitable effect" of a view "is that of evidence, no matter what label the judge may
choose to give it. ' ' 139 The above statement by the Supreme Court illustrates the
practical effect of a view on ajury. "[I]t is unreasonable to assume thatjurors, however
they may be instructed, will apply the metaphysical distinction suggested and ignore
the evidence of their own senses when it conflicts with the testimony of the
witnesses."'140 A number of well-reasoned cases make this argument,' 4 ' as do virtually
all of the commentators.142 To say that, in reaching their conclusions, jurors are able to,
138. Id. at 113.
139. Id. at 121.
140. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 216, at 347. Perhaps this argument loses some force
in a bench trial, where the judge is the finder of fact. However, there is no reason to think that a
judge is more able to, or for that matter should, set aside what he or she sees and knows to be
true, and instead embrace testimony that is contrary to what was seen. See Lillie v. United
States, 953 F.2d 1188, 1190 (10th Cir. 1992) (stating that, for a judge or jury, any kind of
presentation to help determine the truth or understand and assimilate the evidence is itself
evidence); State v. Pauline, 60 P.3d 306, 323 n.15 (Haw. 2002) (treating bench trials and jury
trials alike in the evidentiary value of a view). In addition, it should be remembered that the
strongest argument for not considering a view to be evidence (that is, that there can be no record
made for appeal) also loses force in a bench trial. See infra note 165.
141. See, e.g., Lillie, 953 F.2d at 1190 (stating that a distinction between whether a
view is evidence or not is only semantic, because any kind of presentation like this is itself
evidence); see also Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1289 (1 th Cir. 2003) (agreeing with
Lillie); United States v. Gray, 199 F.3d 547, 549 (1 st Cir. 1999); Wall v. United States Mining
Co., 232 F. 613, 616 (C.C.D. Utah 1905) ("Indeed, any other rule is incapable of practical
application.").
142. Gray, 199 F.3d at 548. For examples of some commentators' views on the issue,
see 3 JONES, supra note 19, § 15:24, at 61; McCoRMICK, supra note 3, § 216, at 347; 2
WEINSTEN & BERGER, supra note 27, § 403.07[4]; and 4 WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 1168, at
385-86 (stating that the suggestion that a view merely enables the jury to comprehend the
testimony "is simply not correct in fact").
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or should, disregard the things that they saw during a view is a form ofjudicial naivety,
which may come at the expense of the parties involved.143
Even if the fact-finder were somehow able to make such a metaphysical distinction
between a non-evidentiary view and an evidentiary one, the view should still be called
evidence. After all, "[i]t would be pointless and largely negate the benefits of a view to
send the jury out to view and then instruct that no weight could be given.., to what
was perceived at the scene."' " In addition, other real objects are considered evidence
so long as they are small enough to be brought into a courtroom and admitted into
evidence. 145 It is inherently unjust to prohibit the admission of evidence on the basis of
its size, and it "defies logic for courts to seek the truth only to the extent that it fits
through the courtroom doors." 46 While there are certainly practical considerations of
jury supervision and procedure to be taken into account when an examination of the
evidence requires leaving the courtroom,1 47 and those considerations may at times
outweigh the probative value of the evidence under a Rule 403 balancing test, 48 this is
cause for denying the motion for a view, not for mislabeling it. There is no legitimate
reason that small objects can be evidence where large objects cannot. 49 "The
acceptance of photographic evidence plus small objects cannot be successfully
distinguished from jury views, ' ' 50 at least as far as their evidentiary effect.'
5 1
B. The Arguments That Views Are Not Evidence Are Without Merit
Those who take the position that a view does not constitute the taking of evidence
usually base that argument on three related grounds. The first, and arguably the
strongest, is that there is no record of a view that is preserved for appeal. 152 The second
is that a view effectively turns the presiding judge or jury member into a "silent
143. See infra notes 226-30 and accompanying text (discussing courts that have
concluded that errors were harmless based on the fact that the jury had been instructed that the
view was not evidence).
144. Wendorf, supra note 23, at 393.
145. Id. at 383 ("[C]ourts have long admitted in evidence objects small enough to be
brought into the courtroom.").
146. State v. Pauline, 60 P.3d 306, 325 (Haw. 2002).
147. Gray, 199 F.3d at 550.
148. See FED. R. EVID. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.").
149. Pauline, 60 P.3d at 324.
150. Wendorf, supra note 23, at 383.
151. See State v. McCausland, 96 S.E. 938, 939 (W. Va. 1918) ("The reason the jury is
taken to view the ground is simply because it is physically impossible to bring it into the
courtroom, and it is therefore necessary, in order that the jury may have all of the light
obtainable upon the subject to which the inquiry is directed, that it be taken and shown these
objects which form a part of the subject of inquiry.").
152. See Park-in Theatres, Inc. v. Ochs, 75 F. Supp 506, 512 (S.D. Ohio 1948)
(questioning how a decision based on a view could be reviewed by a higher court).
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witness" 15 3 in the case, since the parties cannot know exactly what the jurors perceive
during the view, or what conclusions they draw from it.' 4 Related to both of these is
the idea that ajudgment must be based "upon testimony given in open court,"' 5 where
there are procedural safeguards.'56
The Indiana Supreme Court found great merit in the argument that views cannot be
considered evidence because there is no record of a view for appeal. Initially, the court
had held in Evansville, Indianapolis, and Cleveland Straight Line Railroad Co. v.
Cochran5 7 that a view was to be considered evidence and that deference should be
given to a jury that has had a view, since some of the evidence by which the verdict
was reached was not in the record. In Jeffersonville, Madison, and Indianapolis
Railroad Co. v. Bowen, I5 8 the court was persuaded by the appellant's arguments, and
overruled Cochran. The appellant in Bowen argued that a defendant may be convicted
and hanged on insufficient evidence, but the judgment could not be reversed as long as
the prosecutor had obtained a view during the trial. 59 The appellant further argued that
calling a view evidence eliminates the benefit of appeal, and that, since the conducting
of views is under the trial court's discretion, a trial court may effectively deprive a
party of its right to appeal. 160 The Indiana Supreme Court stated, "These reasons have
so much force in them that we feel compelled to overrule [Cochran]."'6'
In Hart v. State,16 2 the Texas Court of Appeals made an intelligent reply to the
argument that a view cannot be put on the record for appeal, although the case involved
a slightly different context. There, in an assault with intent to murder case, the
defendant objected to the display of the victim's clothes, in part "[b]ecause such
testimony [was] not of such a character as can be incorporated in the record for the
Court of Appeals." The court replied that if the admissibility of evidence depends upon
its ability to be incorporated into the record, then the pointing out of a defendant in
court is not admissible. 163 The court continued:
A witness's countenance, tone of voice, mode and manner of expression, and
general demeanor on the stand oftentimes influence the jury as much in estimating
the weight they give and attach to his testimony as the words he utters, and yet
they cannot be sent up with the record, though [it is the duty of the jury] to
153. Close v. Samm, 27 Iowa 503, 508 (1869), available at 1869 WL 388, at *2 (the
purpose of a view is "not to make them silent witnesses in the case, burdened with testimony
unknown to both parties, and in respect to which no opportunity for cross-examination or
correction of error, if any, could be afforded either party").
154. 3 JONES, supra note 19, § 15:24, at 61.
155. State v. Pauline, 60 P.3d 306, 322 (Haw. 2002) (citing McCanunan v. Davis, 127
N.W. 329, 330 (Mich. 1910)).
156. Id.
157. 10 Ind. 560 (1858), available at 1858 WL 4285.
158.40 Ind. 545 (1872), available at 1872 WL 5422.
159. Id. at 548.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. 15 Tex. Ct. App. 202 (1883), available at 1883 WL 8999.
163. While a limited and imperfect recording of this type of identification is possible
through directives such as "Let the record reflect... " transcriptions and other recordings of
views are similarly possible. See infra note 167 and accompanying text.
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consider them in passing upon his testimony. How they have impressed the jury
and influenced their verdict are facts known only to themselves-facts which must
necessarily be unknown to the defendant, to the trial court, and to this court...
and yet they are and always have been the best and most legitimate sources from
which a correct estimate of the value of oral evidence is drawn.... A juror...
often sees, and rightly sees and acts upon, many things which cannot be
incorporated in the record. 164
This same analysis is adopted by many courts and commentators in refuting the
argument that, because a view cannot be incorporated into the record, it cannot
constitute evidence. 165 In addition, an appellate court need not give unreviewable
weight to a jury's conclusions simply because there was a view in the case. 166
The First Circuit made an additional reply to the argument that a view cannot be
incorporated into the record. The court stated that this argument loses force as
technology advances, since "[a] record of a view can be made... through the use of
video or other photographic equipment, as well as through transcription of any remarks
made. ,' 6 7
A third reply to this argument is that cases are tried in an effort to get at the truth in
the first court of record, even though the reviewing court may not have all of the
advantages afforded to the trial court. 168 There are inherent imperfections in appellate
review, and "this is a price we must pay if we hope to obtain the most socially desirable
results in the greatest possible number of cases." 169 Surely the answer is not to impose
the imperfections inherent in appellate review upon the trial court as well.
The second argument against the evidentiary effect of a view, that the fact-finder
becomes a "silent witness," is also without merit. During the course of a trial, many
things may be seen by the fact-finder of which the parties may not be aware,'
7 0
particularly in the context of real evidence or visual aids such as photographs and
164. Hart, 1883 WL 8999, at *17 (internal citations omitted).
165. See, e.g., State v. Pauline, 60 P.3d 306, 323 (Haw. 2002); 1 GREENLEAF, supra
note 49; 4 WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 1168, at 385-86. Also, in bench trials, this argument loses
much of its force, since the impressions gained from a view may be incorporated into the record.
For example, in Rygg v. County of Maui, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1161 (D. Haw. 2000), the
transcript specifically contained the impressions that the trial judge gained in his view.
166. See infra Part IV.C.
167. United States v. Gray, 199 F.3d 547, 549 (1st Cir. 1999). The First Circuit did not
condition the treatment of a view as evidence upon the view being recorded, but was simply
noting "that the concern expressed by some about the problem of creating a record is not
without solutions." Id. at 550 n. 1. A similar argument is also made by Wendorf, supra note 23,
at 384 (stating that the objection to a lack of record "can be adequately answered by providing a
summary of the view proceedings in the record"), and in Pauline, 60 P.3d at 324 (Haw. 2002)
("[G]iven the advancement in technology, recording a view today is much easier and more
comprehensive."). California requires the proceedings at a view to be recorded to the same
extent as the proceedings in the courtroom. CAL. C[v. PROC. CODE § 651(b) (West 1976).
168. Evidentiary Effect, supra note 56, at 114.
169. Id.
170. Hart v. State, 1883 WL 8999, at *17.
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videos.17 1 The thoughts that go through a fact-finder's mind and the conclusions drawn
from the evidence received are not testimony taken in open court. 72 Observation of a
thing that is viewed out of court no more turns the jurors into silent witnesses than
observation of a thing that is viewed in court.1
73
Finally, the argument that evidence should be taken in court where there are
procedural safeguards cannot prevail. Procedural safeguards may be imposed on a
view in order to minimize the danger of impropriety, 174 and using a fear of procedural
defects as a means to argue that a view is not evidence simply encourages the omission
ofproper procedural safeguards when taking a "non-evidentiary view."' 75 A number of
courts and commentators have listed some safeguards that may be fitting. 176 Professor
Wendorf's analogy is appropriate: "The fact that pigs will eat gardens is not a really
good reason for slaughtering all swine. It may be a perfectly good reason for building
fences."' 7 7 As discussed earlier, a fear of procedural defects may be a reason to deny a
motion for a view, but it is not a reason to argue that a view is not evidence. 7 8 By
171. See Mauricio v. State, 104 S.W.3d 919, 921 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (noting that
jurors may see something that the attorneys have missed in photographs, videos, or any other
evidence).
172. See Hart, 1883 WL 8999, at * 17 (noting that the influence that such evidence has
had on a jury and how it has affected their verdict are "facts which must necessarily be unknown
to the defendant, to the trial court, and to this court").
173. It is true that what a jury sees during a view may be harder to control, but this
danger can be minimized with appropriate procedural safeguards, see infra notes 174, 176 and
accompanying text, and views may actually aid the jury in reaching the truth more than
photographs and video, which are subject to manipulation through lighting, angles, and
processing, and which may convey an impression that is not completely accurate. See Rygg v.
County of Maui, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1147 (D. Haw. 2000); Clarke v. Bruckner, 93 F.R.D.
666, 671 (D.V.I. 1982) ("No number of photographs or drawings could give the jury as truthful
a picture of the scene as a visit to the site.").
174. See United States v. Gray, 199 F.3d 547, 550 (1st Cir. 1999) ("Precautions...
must be taken to minimize problems, because jury supervision is more difficult outside the
courtroom.").
175. See Price Bros. v. Phila. Gear Corp., 649 F.2d 416,419 (6th Cir. 1981) (implying
that, "[w]here the purpose of a view is to assist the fact finder... and the view itself is not
considered evidence," some procedural safeguards may be omitted); Southland Enters., Inc. v.
United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 596, 602 (1991) (citing Price Bros. for the proposition that it "is likely
that evidentiary viewings require procedural safeguards," thus arguably implying that non-
evidentiary viewings do not require such safeguards).
176. See, e.g., Wendorf, supra note 23, at 399 (calling for the admonishment of the jury
against independent examination, exploration, or experiment and calling for attendance by the
judge); State v. Pauline, 60 P.3d 306, 325 (Haw. 2002) (stating that view should be conducted
at an appropriate time in the trial, without undue emphasis); Clemente v. Carnicon-P.R. Mgmt.
Assocs., 52 F.3d 383, 386 (1st Cir. 1995) (stating that (1) counsel should be alerted to a
proposed view as early as possible, (2) counsel should be allowed to attend the view, (3)
interaction between jurors and parties may be limited, (4) the judge should attend the view, and
(5) the court reporter should attend to record the view).
177. Wendorf, supra note 23, at 385.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 147-49. Also, errors that occur during views as
a result of procedural defects should be subject to a harmless error analysis. See, e.g., Devin v.
DeTella, 101 F.3d 1206, 1210 (7th Cir. 1996); Lillie v. United States, 953 F.2d 1188, 1192
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using a fear of procedural defects as a justification for not considering a view as
evidence, one simply allows the courts to conduct a view without applying appropriate
procedural safeguards. 1
79
C. Evidentiary Weight of Views
Perhaps the thrust of the debate over the evidentiary value of a view is implicitly
about the weight that should be accorded a view.' 80 Some courts have the mistaken
impression that, if a view is called evidence, the result of the trial court must be
accorded extraordinary deference. 181 This simply is not the case. Rather, a view should
be considered evidence, and should have the evidentiary effect that any other similar
evidence would have under the circumstances - no more and no less.'
82
Many courts that hold that a view is merely a context in which to understand
evidence introduced at trial seem to actually mean that a view in a certain case is
merely illustrative evidence or background evidence.' 83 Naturally, a view that is
illustrative or contextual would carry less evidentiary weight than a substantive view.
While a view would rarely be sufficient evidence upon which to base a verdict, it is
possible to conceive of such instances. Thus, if the sole issue in a case is whether there
(10th Cir. 1992); Pauline, 60 P.3d at 326 (Haw. 2002); see also Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114,
118 (1983) ("'Cases involving [the deprivation of the right to be present at every stage in a trial]
are... subject to the general rule that remedies should be tailored to the injury suffered .... '")
(quoting United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361,364 (1981)). Snyder implicitly approved this
standard. See Snyder v. Massachusettts, 291 U.S. 97, 118 (1934) (criticizing the trial judge's
"blunder" during the view in stating that one of the objects was not present at the time of the
murder, but holding that the "verdict is not upset ... if there was no substantial harm").
179. See infra notes 220-25 and accompanying text.
180. Think, for example, about the concern that led the Indiana Supreme Court to
conclude that a view is not evidence- that the appeals process would be nullified. See supra
notes 157-61 and accompanying text; see also Tarpley v. Hornyak, No. M2002-01466-COA-
R3-CV, 2004 WL 508509, at *3, *11 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2004) (concluding that "the
proper purpose of a view is to enable the judge to better understand the evidence that has been
presented in court," but noting that "the real issue in this case is whether a [fact-finder] can base
its judgment solely on personal observations made during a view").
181. See, e.g., EEOC v. Mercy Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 709 F.2d 1195, 1200 (7th Cir. 1983)
(stating that in jurisdictions where a view is held to be evidence, findings are entitled to great
weight on appeal where a view is had); Beneduci v. Valadares, 812 A.2d 41, 47 (Conn. App. Ct.
2002) ("Conclusions based on [views] are entitled to great weight on appeal.") (quoting
Castonguay v. Plourde, 699 A.2d 226, 262 (Conn. App. Ct. 1997)).
182. Naturally, the circumstances will vary with the type of view that is taken.
183. See Tarpley, 2004 WL 508509, at *6 ("[Clourts stating observations from a view
are not evidence are often actually stating that such observations cannot be used as ...
competent evidence."). Illustrative evidence, like a photograph of a crime scene, illustrates the
testimony of witnesses. Illustrative evidence requires an eyewitness who can affirm that a view
would fairly and accurately depict the property. See Wetherill v. Univ. of Chicago, 565 F. Supp.
1553, 1561-62 (N.D. Il. 1983). Note also that photographs, just like views, may sometimes be
illustrative evidence and other times may provide independent evidence. See United States v.
Rembert, 863 F.2d 1023, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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exists a window in one wall of a building,' 84 whether a defendant was selling grain by a
false measure,' 85 or anything else that is determinable in and of itself through the
view,186 then the jury's decision should be given great deference, since the jurors had
the opportunity to examine firsthand the object in question. ' 87 If, however, the view is
"essentially background in nature,"' 88 similar to an expert witness's explanation of
terms of a trade, 18 9 then the fact that the jury took a view should carry very little
weight, not only with thejury but also with a reviewing tribunal. Similarly, if the issue
in the case is something for which an expert witness is required (for example, the value
of a certain piece of land or the probable speed at which a car was traveling as
ascertained from the length of skid marks), then a view should be treated like any other
evidence in the case, and the jury's personal opinions would be insufficient to support
a verdict not based at least in part on the expert testimony.'
90
In the end, the weight that should be accorded a view by a reviewing tribunal is
directly proportional to the view's probative value.' 9' Thus, a California court wisely
stated, "a view of the scene [is] independent evidence on which a finding may be made
and sustained. But this is only true to the extent that a view of the premises has
probative value as to a particular issue."' 92 Similarly, a judge in the Circuit Court for
the District of Utah, after concluding that his own view did provide evidence, stated,
"[u]nder these circumstances, and concerning a matter involving special knowledge...
it would be a great presumption on my part to attach material weight to impressions
184. This is a hypothetical often used by courts to argue that a view is evidence. See,
e.g., Denver, Tex. & Ft. Worth R.R. Co. v. Pulaski Irrigating Ditch Co., 52 P. 224, 226 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1898); Yeager v. State, 278 P. 665, 669 (Okla. Crim. App. 1929).
185. See Hart v. State, 15 Tex. Ct. App. 202 (1883), available at 1883 WL 8999.
186. Courts have used numerous illustrations of purely physical issues in an effort to
persuade readers that the contention that a view cannot be evidence is ridiculous. Some of these
illustrations include: the color of an object, Carpenter v. Carpenter, 101 A. 628, 631 (N.H.
1917); the hilliness of a farm, Washburn v. Milwaukee & Lake Winnebago R.R. Co., 18 N.W.
328, 330 (Wis. 1884); that a building was burned, id.; that a bullet caused a hole in a door panel,
People v. Milner, 54 P. 833, 839 (Cal. 1898); and whether a piece of land is a marsh, Hatton v.
Gregg, 88 P. 592, 593-94 (Cal. Ct. App. 1906).
187. This assumes, of course, that there is no evidence that the conditions of the place
viewed were changed, that the jury was taken to the wrong place, or that the jury had been
duped in some other way.
188. FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory committee notes. Views of real estate are listed among
charts, photographs, and murder weapons as evidence that is universally offered and accepted,
and is essentially background in nature. Id. (emphasis added).
189. Lillie v. United States, 953 F.2d 1188, 1190 n.4 (10th Cir. 1992).
190. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 216, at 347. This reasoning provides a response to
the concern of the Tennessee Court of Appeals in Tarpley that, if views are a source of evidence,
the court would be forced to affirm the ruling of the trial court even though it was "particularly
troubled by the trial court's determination of causation . . . [that relied] only on his own
observations and expertise." Tarpley v. Homyak, No. M2002-01466-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL
508509, at *12 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2004).
191. See Sylva v. Kuck, 49 Cal. Rptr. 512, 519 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Wall v. U.S.
Mining Co., 232 F. 613,617 (C.C.D. Utah 1905).
192. Sylva, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 519 (citations omitted).
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gained by my own inspection."' 93 Thus, a view should never become disproportionate
to other evidence, 194 but, where appropriate, should be able to provide at least a partial
basis for a verdict. 195 Just as a jury should always consider all of the sources of
evidence in conjunction with one another,' 96 so should a reviewing tribunal.
V. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
One may wonder whether there is a practical difference between the two positions,
or if, as the Tenth Circuit has said, this is only a game of semantics,197 especially if, as
the Supreme Court held in Snyder, 19 this issue makes no difference in a criminal
defendant's constitutional right to attend a view. 199 However, if it can be said that there
are no practical effects resulting from having taken one position over the other, one
wonders why some courts have recently bothered to explicitly reverse their
positions,200 and why the Tenth Circuit bothered to disagree with the Sixth Circuit "to
the extent it indicate[d] that a view sometimes is not evidence. ' 0'
In fact, in many circumstances, the distinction is one of semantics. For instance, a
court that considered a view to be evidence could have reached the same holding as the
Sixth Circuit reached in Price Bros. by calling the view harmless error.202 Such a court
could have viewed the admission of the law clerk's report under the standard of
203
erroneous admission of evidence, and found that the verdict was supported by other
substantial evidence. However, there are several situations in which the difference
carries practical implications, and these differences merit consideration of the issue.
A. The Defendant's Right to Be Present
One major ramification of the distinction is that, notwithstanding Snyder, many state
courts that deny a criminal defendant the right to attend a jury view do so on the basis
193. Wall, 232 F. at 617.
194. Wendorf, supra note 23, at 392.
195. Id. at 393.
196. SEYMOUR DwIGHT THOMPSON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRIALS IN AcTtONS
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 895, at 684 (1889) ("But the evidence which the jurors may acquire from
making the view is not to be elevated to the character of exclusive or predominating evidence.
They are not to disregard other evidence in regard to the character and value of the property; and
an instruction which conveys to them the impression that they may do so is erroneous.").
197. Lillie v. United States, 953 F.2d 1188, 1190 (10th Cir. 1992). While the Tenth
Circuit did state that the difference was one of semantics, it is possible that it was simply
referring to the effect that an instruction that a view is not evidence would have on a jury, and
not to overall practical differences between the two positions. See id.
198. 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
199. See supra notes 128-37 and accompanying text.
200. See, e.g., United States v. Gray, 199 F.3d 547, 548 (1st Cir. 1999); State v.
Pauline, 60 P.3d 306, 325 (Haw. 2002).
201. Lillie, 953 F.2d at 1190.
202. For a description of Price Bros., see text accompanying notes 83-91.
203. Lillie, 953 F.2d at 1192.
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that a view is not called evidence in that jurisdiction.204 Similarly, some of the courts
that have held that the defendant has a right to attend a view have done so because they
consider a view to be evidence. 205 For instance, the court in In re Application to Take
Testimony in Criminal Case Outside District stated, "[a]uthorities now generally agree
that the view provides independent evidence. Snyder, indicating that the defendant
does not have to be present, is no longer useful since it is inconsistent with general
modem principles.,
20 6
Similarly, in State v. Francisco,20 7 the jury was to take a view of a bullet-riddled car
and the defendant chose not to attend the view so that the jury would not see him in
restraints.20 8 The Washington Court of Appeals held that, while a criminal defendant is
guaranteed the right to be present at every critical stage of a trial, a view is not part of
the trial and has no evidentiary value. 209 The defendant argued that the view was a
means by which the state introduced evidence that could not be brought into the
courtroom. The court replied, "[wie disagree. Thejury was instructed that the view was
not evidence." 210 In State v. Cassano,21 a statute specifically conferred upon the
212defendant the right to be present during a jury view. The defendant was denied this
right at trial, and the Ohio Supreme Court held that this did not materially prejudice the
defendant because, inter alia, a view of a crime scene was not considered evidence.213
Since a view may have a very real and even dramatic outcome on ajury despite any
label that is put on it,21 4 it would seem to be good policy to allow the parties to be
204. See supra note 131; Stephenson v. State, 742 N.E.2d 463, 493-94 (Ind. 2001)
(stating that a defendant has no right to attend a view because a view is not evidence); 22
WRiGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 15, § 5176 n.6 (Supp. 2004).
205. 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1162 (1989 & Supp. 2003). In Martin v. State, 287
S.E.2d 244,246-47 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981), the court distinguished between an "evidentiary view"
and a view of a crime scene, holding that a defendant has a right to be present at the former but
not the latter.
206. 102 F.R.D. 521, 524 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). The court does not expressly identify these
principles, and cites only to Wigmore's general discussion of views, 4 WIGMORE, supra note 4,
§§ 1162-69, for its assertion regarding Snyder. In reApplication to Take Testimony, 102 F.R.D.
at 524; see also United States v. Walls, 443 F.2d 1220, 1223 (6th Cir. 1971).
207. 26 P.3d 1008 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
208. Id. at 1012.
209. Id. Many courts have held that, where the defendant has a right to be present at a
view, he may waive it for tactical reasons, such as to avoid having the jury see him in restraints.
See People v. Cooper, 809 P.2d 865 (Cal. 1991) (applying in non-capital cases); T.D.T. v. State,
561 So. 2d 1333 (Fla. Ct. App. 1990); Harwell v. England, 217 S.E.2d 154 (Ga. 1975); People
v. King, 534 N.W.2d 534 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995); Jones v. Commonwealth, 317 S.E.2d482 (Va.
1984). See generally 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1162 (1989 & Supp. 2003) ("Authorities differ
as to whether the presence of an accused is necessary when the jury are taken to view the scene
of the crime; however, it is generally held that whatever right he has may be waived.").
210. Francisco, 26 P.3d at 1013.
211. 772 N.E.2d 81 (Ohio 2002).
212. Id. at 96.
213. Id.
214. See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
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present during the view. 215 This would be especially true of a criminal defendant, and
such a defendant may even have rights to be present at a view.2 1 However, it is
illogical to think that a defendant's rights depend solely on the way a view is
characterized. It would be absurd to argue that a defendant has no right (constitutional
or otherwise) to attend a view if the view is characterized as "a context in which to
apply the evidence," but that the same defendant would have a right to attend the same
view if it were called "evidence," 217 particularly if the practical effect of the view on a
fact-finder is the same.
218
Parties could waive their right to attend the view, even if it were constitutional,
21 9
and there may at times be legitimate reasons for excluding parties from a view, but the
groundless assertion that a view is not evidence is not such a legitimate reason. The
idea that a view is not evidence simply does not make sense,2 20 and it is improper for a
court to attempt to legitimize the exclusion of a party from a view based on this
unfounded assertion.
215. Starr v. State, 115 P. 356, 366 (Okla. Crim. App. 1911) ("[ilt would be better and
safer for him to accompany the jury, if convenient."). In Snyder, the Supreme Court did not
comment on what the better practice may have been, but simply on Constitutional minimums.
See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) ("[P]rocedure does not run foul of the
Fourteenth Amendment because another method may seem... to be fairer or wiser .. ").
216. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. There is some argument that a
defendant may now have constitutional rights to attend a view. See United States v. Walls, 443
F.2d 1220, 1223 n.3 (6th Cir. 1971) (requiring the presence of the defendant based on its
"supervisory authority" over the district courts, but questioning "whether evolving
Constitutional principles have eroded the basis for the majority's position in Snyder"); In re
Application to Take Testimony in Criminal Case Outside Dist., 102 F.R.D. 521,524 (E.D.N.Y.
1984) ("Snyder, indicating that the defendant does not have to be present, is no longer useful
since it is inconsistent with general modem principles."). See generally 1 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM,
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 401.11, at 284 n.13 (5th ed. 2001) (doubting whether
Snyder would be followed today); MCCORMICK, supra note 3, §216, at 346-47 (when the view
itself is deemed to constitute evidence, "the right of the defendant to be present in all probability
possesses a constitutional underpinning"). However, McCoRMICK does not cite any authorities
for this proposition, but rather attempts to distinguish Snyder. Id.
217. The Snyder Court stated that:
To say that the defendant may be excluded from the scene if the court tells the jury
that the view has no other function than to give them understanding of the
evidence, but that there is an impairment of the constitutional privileges of a
defendant thus excluded if the court tells the jury that the view is part of the
evidence-to make the securities of the constitution depend upon such quiddities is
to cheapen and degrade them.
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 121-22 (1934).
218. See supra notes 139-43.
219. Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 20 (1973) (holding that, at least in non-
capital cases, a defendant waives his right to be present where he is voluntarily absent from the
proceedings).
220. See supra Part IV.A-B.
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B. Procedural Safeguards
Another real-world result of a court's position on this issue is the role that
procedural safeguards play in the view process. When a view is not considered
evidence, procedural safeguards will likely be seen as less vital,221 which is particularly
disturbing in light of the fact that the view will almost certainly have the same effect on
the fact-finder as it would have had if it been termed "evidence.,222 Parties are then
robbed of safeguards that perhaps should have been implemented. For instance, one
court stated, "[j]udges may even make site visits without the parties themselves
present, provided the visit is not evidentiary." '223 The court cited Price Bros.,22 4
discussed above. 225 The court went on to state that it "is likely that evidentiary
viewings require procedural safeguards," implying that views that are not considered
226
evidentiary need not apply such safeguards. This reasoning is flawed. Views should
be called evidence, and proper safeguards should be applied when a view is taken.
C. Prejudicial Error
Courts have also held that, where a view is not considered evidence, any error that
may have resulted from the view is less likely to be prejudicial. Price Bros.221 is one
example of this. 28 Another example is State v. Palmer,229 which indicated that an
instruction that a view was not evidence reduced the prejudice that may have arisen
when the jury viewed locations that had not been previously agreed upon.230 However,
from a practical perspective, it is doubtful that such an instruction had any real impact
231
on the jurors' perceptions.
221. See Price Bros. v. Phila. Gear Corp., 649 F.2d 416,419 (6th Cir. 1981) (implying
that where the purpose of a view is not to provide evidence, safeguards are less necessary).
While the Sixth Circuit recognized that some views may provide evidence, other jurisdictions in
which views never provide evidence would no doubt see less need to implement fundamental
safeguards.
222. See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
223. Southland Enters., Inc. v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 596, 601 (1991).
224. 649 F.2d at 420-21.
225. See supra notes 83-91 and accompanying text. While non-party views are clearly
contrary to our adversarial system, see Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc., 251 F.3d 1252,
1266-67 (9th Cir. 2001) (denouncing off-the-record fact gathering); Lillie v. United States, 953
F.2d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir. 1992) (same), what is worse is that if Price Bros. allows for such
views, then it could also be argued that Price Bros. allows a judge to send her law clerk to take a
view without notice to the parties, provided the judge explicitly states that the view was not
evidentiary.
226. Southland Enters., Inc., 24 Cl. Ct. at 602.
227. 649 F.2d 416 (6th Cir. 1981).
228. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
229. 687 N.E.2d 685 (Ohio 1997).
230.22 WIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 15, § 5176 n.6 (Supp. 2004).
231. See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
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D. Whether a View May Be Conducted
Another practical effect of this issue relates to a court's discretion to grant or deny
motions for views. For instance, in State v. Fricks2 the Washington Supreme Court's
position that a view does not constitute evidence required the trial court to deny the
defendant's motion for a view of the location in question. In that case, the defendant
was on trial for robbery. 2 3 He claimed to have seen a broken window from a certain
location and there was conflicting evidence as to whether this window was visible from
that location.3 The defendant moved for a view and the trial court denied the
motion. 35 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Washington stated that "[tihis was not a
proper case for a jury view" because the "purpose of ajury view is to aid the jury in
better understanding the evidence, not to take new evidence," and "[i]n this case ajury
view would only serve to let the jurors make their own observation of whether the
broken window could be seen.
236
E. Procedure
Finally, the question of whether a view is evidence can have practical effects when
it comes to procedural matters. In South Carolina criminal prosecutions, the defendant
237is allowed the final closing argument if he has introduced no evidence. In State v.
Mouzon, 238 the defendant in a South Carolina criminal case made a motion for a view,
which was granted. The judge in the trial court characterized the view as evidence, and
subsequently denied the defendant's request to make the final closing argument. 2 9 The
South Carolina Supreme Court held that this was error, because "[a] viewing of the
scene of the crime is not regarded as evidence."
24°
In United States v. Harris,24 1 the court concluded that, since a view is evidence, it
comprises part of the case of the requesting party. Thus, a view should take place
during the presentation of the case of the party who offers it so that the court will be
able to consider all of the evidence of a party's case-in-chief if the other party makes a
motion for a directed verdict.
232. 588 P.2d 1328 (Wash. 1979).
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. This last statement may lead one to question the accuracy of the earlier
proposition that it is the goal of the trial court to get at the truth. See supra notes 168-69 and
accompanying text. There could hardly be stronger evidence as to the visibility of the window
than an in-person examination.
237. Id. at 921.
238. 485 S.E.2d 918 (S.C. 1997).
239. Id. at 920.
240. Id.
241. 141 F. Supp. 418, 419 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
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CONCLUSION
Views, whether taken by a judge or by a jury, are evidence. Not only is any other
rule impractical, as the Supreme Court noted in Snyder,2 4 but to hold that a view is not
evidence is unfair to a party whose evidence is too large to be brought into a
courtroom. In addition, there are no forceful arguments for the proposition that a view
should not be treated as evidence, particularly if the view is taken under procedural
safeguards and some type of recording of the view is made to the extent that it is
reasonable to do so.
Views have been around for many years, and although technology has to some
degree obviated them, views are likely to be an important part of many trials for years
to come. After all, "[i]f a picture is worth a thousand words, then the real thing is worth
a thousand pictures.
'
,
243
242. 291 U.S. 97, 121 (1934).
243. Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1266 (9th Cir. 2001).
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